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A quantum string seal encodes the value of a (bit) string as a quantum state in such a way that
everyone can extract a non-negligible amount of available information on the string by a suitable
measurement. Moreover, such measurement must disturb the quantum state and is likely to be
detected by an authorized verifier. In this way, the intactness of the encoded quantum state plays
the role of a wax seal in the digital world. Here I analyze the security of quantum string seal
by studying the information disturbance tradeoff of a measurement. This information disturbance
tradeoff analysis extends the earlier results of Bechmann-Pasquinucci et al. and Chau by concluding
that all quantum string seals are insecure. Specifically, I find a way to obtain non-trivial available
information on the string that escapes the verifier’s detection with at least 50% chance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of quantum seal was introduced by
Bechmann-Pasquinucci to capture the essence of an en-
velop with sealed wax in the digital world [1]. Specifically,
a quantum (bit) seal is a method to encode a classical bit
by some quantum particles in such a way that everyone
can find out the value of the bit with high chance by
an appropriate measurement. Moreover, any such mea-
surement must disturb the state of the quantum particles
so that an authorized person, who has some extra infor-
mation on the state of the particles, can detect such a
measurement with high probability [1].
A few quantum sealing schemes have been proposed.
They fall into the following three types. The original
scheme by Bechmann-Pasquinucci [1] and the one by
Chau [2] are perfect quantum bit seals because every-
one can find out the value of the bit with certainty. The
quantum bit seals introduced by Singh and Srikanth [3]
as well as He [4] are imperfect quantum bit seals as read-
ers cannot correctly determine the value of the bit with
certainty. Recently, He [5] extended the notion of sealing
a bit to sealing a bit string in a natural way by propos-
ing an imperfect quantum bit string seal which separately
encodes each bit of a classical string. Parameters in He’s
scheme are set in such a way that one has a high chance to
correctly extract a large portion of the string. However,
one has negligibly small chance to correctly determine
the whole string [5].
Density matrices representing any two distinct classi-
cal messages in a perfect quantum seal must be orthogo-
nal. Hence, there exits a projective measurement to find
out the encoded message without disturbing the quan-
tum state. Using this idea, Bechmann-Pasquinucci et al.
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proved the insecurity of all perfect quantum (bit) seals
provided that one has access to a quantum computer [6].
Recently, He showed certain bounds relating the infor-
mation gain and the measurement detection probability
for any quantum bit seal [7]. However, his bound is not
tight. In contrast, Chau proved that all imperfect quan-
tum bit seals are insecure by giving an explicit measure-
ment strategy. In addition, he obtained a lower bound for
the fidelity of the resultant quantum state after a mea-
surement. More importantly, this lower bound is greater
than 1/2 and is attainable by certain quantum sealing
schemes [8].
The insecurity proof by Chau in Ref. [8] relies heavily
on the properties of trace distance between two density
matrices. Generalizing his proof to the case of sealing
more than two classical states is not straight-forward.
Furthermore, the security analysis of quantum string
commitment by Buhrman et al. [9, 10] illustrated two
important points. First, more than one inequivalent se-
curity parameters may exist for a quantum string cryp-
tographic scheme; and second, the security of a quantum
string cryptographic scheme may be very different from
that of a quantum bit one. Therefore, it is important to
study the security of quantum string seal thoroughly.
In this Paper, I analyze the information disturbance
tradeoff for a general quantum seal that maps a fixed
number N of distinct classical messages to N density ma-
trices. Moreover, the probabilities of occurrence of these
classical messages need not be equal. I begin by introduc-
ing the general formalism and the security requirements
for a quantum seal as well as the notion of the most
stringent quantum seal in Sec. II. Then I report a mea-
surement strategy that obtains non-zero amount of infor-
mation on the original message and introduce two perfor-
mance measures in Sec. III. I also prove the optimality
of this measurement strategy against the most stringent
quantum seal under one of the performance measures.
And I also argue that this strategy also performs well
2under the other performance measure in Sec. III. Using
these information disturbance analyses, I show that all
imperfect quantum seals, including quantum string seals
in which N = 2n, are insecure in Sec. IV. Finally, a
summary is given in Sec. V.
II. QUANTUM SEAL
A. Quantum seal and its security requirements
A quantum seal is a scheme for Alice to encode a fixed
number N of distinct classical messages as publicly acces-
sible quantum mixed states known as the sealed states.
(Although N is a fixed integer and the dimension of the
sealed states is finite, readers can check that the proofs
and discussions reported in this paper can be easily ex-
tended to the case when the number of distinct classical
messages N as well as the dimension of the quantum
mixed states involved are infinite.) It has to satisfy:
1. Any member of the public, say Bob, can correctly
determine a significant portion of the original clas-
sical message chosen by Alice, known as the sealed
message, with non-negligible probability by a mea-
surement.
2. Any such measurement in criterion 1 must disturb
the sealed state so that an authorized verifier may
correctly detect the measurement with non-zero
(unconditional) probability.
3. Criterion 2 still holds after replacing the uncon-
ditional probability by the probability conditioned
on Bob’s successful determination of a significant
portion of the sealed message.
In the language of information theory, criterion 1
means that the mutual information on the sealed message
obtained by Bob divided by the entropy of the original
classical message is of order of 1. Clearly, this criterion
is necessary; for otherwise, even an honest Bob has negli-
gible chance to obtain a significant fraction of the sealed
message.
The maximum probability for Bob to correctly de-
termine the sealed message can be made close to 1/N .
Nonetheless, in order to satisfy criterion 1, there exists
a partition P of the N distinct classical messages with
log |P| . logN such that the maximum probability of
correctly determining which set in the partition the origi-
nal message belongs to is much greater than 1/|P|. (Let’s
use He’s quantum string scheme as an example to illus-
trate this point. Although it is not likely to correctly ex-
tract the entire sealed string in He’s scheme, it is highly
probable to correctly determine, say, the first 99% of the
sealed string [5]. In fact, one possible choice of P in
this case is to partition according to the values of the
first 99% of the original message string.) Through the
partition P, the quantum seal that encodes N distinct
classical messages can be regarded as a seal that encodes
|P| distinct classical messages. With this identification
in mind, I may assume from now on that the maximum
probability of correctly finding the original classical mes-
sage pmax to be much greater than 1/N . Furthermore,
without loss of generality, I label these N classical mes-
sages by 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 in such a way that the a priori
probability of occurrence ηi for the message i obeys the
constraints η0 ≥ η1 ≥ · · · ≥ ηN−1 > 0 and
∑N−1
i=0 ηi = 1.
A quantum sealing scheme is called a quantum bit seal
if N = 2 and a quantum (bit) string seal if N = 2n.
Moreover, the scheme is perfect if Bob can determine
the entire classical message with certainty; otherwise, the
scheme is imperfect [8].
B. A game-theoretic formulation of the problem
Quantum seal is in some sense a game between Alice
and Bob. For a given sealing scheme used by Alice, Bob
tries to gain as much information on the sealed message
as possible on the one hand and to reduce the chance
of being caught by the verifier on the other hand. And
Alice surely wants to pick a sealing scheme that makes
Bob’s task as difficult as possible.
To analyze the security of quantum seals, all sealed
states can be assumed to be pure as using purified states
increase the verifier’s chance to detect Bob’s measure-
ment [8]. Using the notation used in Ref. [8], the sealed
state for message i is
|ψ˜i〉 =
∑
j
λij |ψij〉B ⊗ |φj〉A (1)
for all i, where |ψij〉’s are normalized states that are not
necessarily mutually orthogonal, and |φj〉’s are orthonor-
mal states. Note that particles labeled by the subscript
“B” in Eq. (1) are publicly accessible, and those labeled
by the subscript “A” are accessible only to authorized
verifiers. Thus, the state of the publicly accessible parti-
cles is
ρi =
∑
j
|λij |2|ψij〉〈ψij | . (2)
if the sealed message is i.
Bob’s attempt to obtain some information on the clas-
sical message can be described by a positive operator-
valued measure (POVM) measurement E on the publicly
accessible particles. From the verifier’s point of view,
this measurement changes the sealed state |ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i| to
E ⊗ I(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|) ≡ E˜(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|).
I write E = ∑N−1j=0 Lj , where Lj is the superoperator
describing Bob’s action when he concludes that the sealed
message is j. Then, the probability that Alice’s original
message is i and Bob’s measurement on the sealed state
yields j is given by
Prij = ηiTr[Lj ⊗ I(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|)] ≡ ηiTr[L˜j(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|)] . (3)
3In addition, Bob’s mutual information on the original
message equals
I ≡ I(E) ≡ I(E˜)
= −
∑
i
ηi log2 ηi −
∑
j
(∑
k
Prkj
)
log2
(∑
k
Prkj
)
+
∑
i,j
Prij log2 Prij . (4)
A simple way to measure Bob’s average chance of being
caught is to compute the average fidelity of the sealed
state [8], namely,
F¯ ≡ F¯ (E) ≡ F¯ (E˜) =
N−1∑
i=0
ηi〈ψ˜i|E˜(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|)|ψ˜i〉 . (5)
In other words, the average fidelity (or fidelity for short)
F¯ measures the mean disturbance caused by Bob’s mea-
surement E . Since 1 − F¯ is the probability of detecting
Bob’s measurement, F¯ is a performance indicator for cri-
terion 2 stated in Subsec. II A.
Bob’s chance of being caught given that he correctly
determined the sealed message is reflected in the average
fidelity of the sealed state conditional on Bob’s success
F¯cond, namely,
F¯cond ≡ F¯cond(E) ≡ F¯cond(E˜)
=
N−1∑
i=0
ηi〈ψ˜i|L˜i(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|)|ψ˜i〉
Tr[L˜i(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|)]
. (6)
(Note that those terms with Tr[L˜i(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|)] = 0 in the
above equation are regarded as 0.) Thus, the average con-
ditional fidelity (or conditional fidelity for short) F¯cond
measures the mean disturbance caused by Bob’s mea-
surement E conditioned on his successful recovery of the
sealed message. Since 1− F¯cond is the probability of de-
tecting Bob’s measurement conditioned on Bob’s success-
ful recovery of the sealed message, F¯cond is a performance
indicator for criterion 3 in Subsec. II A.
I denote the probability of correctly determining the
sealed message using the POVM measurement E by p.
Surely, p ≤ pmax. Furthermore, I assume p ≥ 1/N as
no one is interested in those E ′s that perform worse than
random guessing. (Interestingly, the scheme with ηi =
1/N and ρi = ρj for all i, j illustrates that p may not be
less than 1/N .)
Amongst all the POVM’s whose probability of cor-
rectly determining the sealed message is p, Bob would
like to pick the one that minimizes the average chance of
being detected by a verifier (and hence maximizes F¯ ). In
contrast, Alice would like to pick a seal that minimizes
F¯ . Thus, the average fidelity minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax)
for the optimal measurement strategy against the most
stringent seal is found by first taking the maximum over
all possible POVM measurements E ’s used by Bob whose
probability of correctly determining the original message
is p for a given sealing scheme, and then by taking the
minimum over all quantum seals with maximum proba-
bility of correctly determining the message pmax by Al-
ice [8]. The average conditional fidelity for the optimal
measurement strategy against the most stringent seal
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) is similarly defined.
Since F¯ and F¯cond are two different performance
indicators, one expects that minAlicemaxBob F¯ and
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond have to be attained by two dif-
ferent sealing schemes and measurement strategies. I
show in Sec. III that this is indeed the case for a gen-
eral N . Nevertheless, for N ≤ 5, optimal sealing scheme
and measurement strategies as reflected by the two per-
formance indicators can be chosen to be the same.
III. THE OPTIMAL MEASUREMENT
STRATEGY
A. A measurement strategy and its performance
Obviously, pmax is equal to the maximum probability
of correctly distinguishing the mixed states ρi’s with a
priori occurrence probabilities ηi’s. The set of POVM
elements {Πk}N−1k=0 that maximizes such a probability is
given by [11, 12]
Πk(ηkρk − ηjρj)Πj = 0 (7)
and ∑
i
ηiρiΠi − ηjρj ≥ 0 (8)
for all 0 ≤ j, k ≤ N − 1. In other words, pmax and Πi’s
satisfy the equation
pmax =
N−1∑
i=0
ηiTr(Πiρi) =
N−1∑
i=0
ηi〈ψ˜i|Πi ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉 . (9)
Clearly, 1/N ≤ η0 ≤ pmax ≤ 1. In fact, pmax = 1/N if
and only if ρi = ρj for all i, j; and pmax = 1 if and only
if ρi’s are mutually orthogonal.
I write the spectral decomposition of Πi as
Πi =
∑
j
µij |eij〉〈eij | , (10)
where {|eij〉}j are complete sets of orthonormal state kets
for all i and µij ≥ 0 for all i, j. Based on the Πi’s, I
construct
Mi =
∑
j
(
1− ν
N
+ νµij
)1/2
|eij〉〈eij | , (11)
where
ν ≡ ν(p, pmax, N) = pN − 1
pmaxN − 1 (12)
4for all p ∈ [1/N, 1]. Clearly, ν ∈ [0, 1] and hence Mi’s are
well-defined measurement operators. I denote the POVM
measurement with Kraus operators {Mi}N−1i=0 by Ep,pmax
for
N−1∑
i=0
ηiTr(M
†
iMiρi) =
1− ν
N
+ ν
N−1∑
i=0
ηiTr(Πiρi) = p .
(13)
Using the POVM measurement Ep,pmax , the probabil-
ity that Alice’s original classical message is i and Bob’s
measurement on the sealed state yields j is equal to
Prij = ηi〈ψ˜i|(M †j ⊗ I)(Mj ⊗ I)|ψ˜i〉
= ηi
[
1− ν
N
+ νTr(Πjρi)
]
. (14)
In particular, if p, pmax are large and ν is close to 1, then
Prii is generally much larger than Prij for j 6= i. Conse-
quently, the mutual information I is close to the maxi-
mum possible value of −∑i ηi log2 ηi. (For example, in
the He’s scheme [5], Bob’s mutual information obtained
by the POVM Epmax,pmax on the sealed message equals
I = 0.99n[1+ ǫ log2 ǫ+ (1− ǫ) log2 ǫ] where ǫ is the small
control parameter in his scheme.)
To investigate the disturbance caused by this POVM
measurement, I use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. Then,
f(x) =
√
νx+
1− ν
N
−
√
1− ν
N
−
(√
ν +
1− ν
N
−
√
1− ν
N
)
x ≥ 0 (15)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Besides, the equality holds if and only
if x = 0 or 1.
Proof. By solving the equation df/dx = 0 and consid-
ering d2f/dx2, I find that the continuous function f(x)
has a single local maximum in the interval [0, 1]. Hence,
f(x) ≥ min(f(0), f(1)) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
f(x) = 0 if and only if x = 0 or 1. 
A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is that
Mi ≥
√
1− ν
N
I +
(√
ν +
1− ν
N
−
√
1− ν
N
)
Πi
≡ a(ν,N)I + b(ν,N)Πi ≡ aI + bΠi (16)
for all i. And the equality holds if and only if Πi is a
projector.
To find a lower bound for minAlicemaxBob F¯ , I substi-
tute Eq. (16) into Eq. (5) to obtain
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯ (p, pmax)
≥ F¯ (Ep,pmax)
≥
N−1∑
i,j=0
ηi
∣∣∣〈ψ˜i|aI ⊗ I + bΠj ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉∣∣∣2
= Na2 + 2ab+ b2
N−1∑
i,j=0
ηi
∣∣∣〈ψ˜i|Πj ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉∣∣∣2 . (17)
Subjected to the constraints in Eq. (9) and
N−1∑
j=0
〈ψ˜i|Πj ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉 = 1 (18)
for all i, the last line of Eq. (17) is minimized if
〈ψ˜i|Πj ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉 =


pmax if i = j ,
1− pmax
N − 1 if i 6= j .
(19)
Consequently,
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯ (p, pmax)
≥ 1−
(√
ν +
1− ν
N
−
√
1− ν
N
)2
×
[
1− p2max −
(1− pmax)2
N − 1
]
(20)
for all 1/N ≤ p ≤ pmax, where ν is given by Eq. (12).
To find a lower bound for minAlicemaxBob F¯cond, I sub-
stitute Eq. (16) into Eq. (6) to obtain
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯cond(p, pmax)
≥ F¯cond(Ep,pmax)
≥
N−1∑
i=0
ηi
(
a+ b〈ψ˜i|Πi ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉
)2
a2 + ν〈ψ˜i|Πi ⊗ I|ψ˜i〉
. (21)
Note that the function g(x) = (a + bx)2/(a2 + νx) is
convex for any a, b, ν, x ≥ 0. So by applying Jensen’s
inequality to the right hand side of Eq. (21) and by using
Eq. (9), I conclude that
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯cond(p, pmax) ≥ (a+ bpmax)
2
a2 + νpmax
=
(a+ bpmax)
2
p
. (22)
B. The optimality of the measurement strategy
with respected to the average fidelity performance
measure
For an arbitrary quantum seal chosen by Alice, it may
be possible to find a POVM measurement E , whose prob-
ability of correctly determining the sealed message equals
5p, satisfying F¯ (E) > F¯ (Ep,pmax). However, Alice may
choose the quantum seal reported in the next paragraph.
It turns out that the value of F¯ (E) for this seal is upper-
bounded by the right hand side of Eq. (20). This makes
Ep,pmax an optimal measurement strategy for Bob when
using F¯ as the performance indicator.
Consider the quantum sealing scheme with ηi = 1/N
and
|ψ˜i〉 = p1/2max|i〉B ⊗ |i〉A ⊗ |i〉A
+
√
1− pmax
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
|j〉B ⊗ |j〉A ⊗ |i〉A (23)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, where each of the three quantum
registers used in the above scheme is N -dimensional with
basis {|j〉}N−1j=0 . It is straight-forward to check that |ψ˜i〉’s
are orthonormal and that
ρi = TrA(|ψ˜i〉〈ψ˜i|) = pmax|i〉〈i|+ 1− pmax
N − 1 (I − |i〉〈i|)
=
(pmaxN − 1)|i〉〈i|+ (1− pmax)I
N − 1
≡ c(pmax, N)|i〉〈i|+ d(pmax, N)I
≡ c|i〉〈i|+ dI . (24)
Now I show that this sealing scheme is the most strin-
gent one in the sense that the resultant fidelity of the
quantum state after any POVM measurement by Bob is
upper-bounded by the right hand side of Eq. (20). Recall
that E can be written as∑N−1i=0 Li where Li is the super-
operator describing Bob’s action when he concludes that
the sealed message is i. In general, the action of each Li
on a density matrix ρ can be written as
Li(ρ) =
∑
j
QijρQ
†
ij . (25)
Clearly, Qij ’s satisfy
∑
i,j
Q†ijQij = I (26)
and
1
N
∑
i,j
Tr(Q†ijQijρi) = p . (27)
From Eqs. (5) and (23), the average fidelity of the state
after Bob has applied the POVM E is given by
F¯ =
1
N
∑
i,j,k
|c〈i|Qjk|i〉+ dTr(Qjk)|2
=
c2
N
∑
i,j,k
|〈i|Qjk|i〉|2 + d(d+ 2c
N
)
∑
j,k
|Tr(Qjk)|2
≤ c
2
N
∑
i,j,k,m
〈i|Q†jk|m〉〈m|Qjk|i〉
+ d(d+
2c
N
)
∑
j,k
|Tr(Qjk)|2
= c2 + d(d+
2c
N
)
∑
j,k
|Tr(Qjk)|2 , (28)
where the equality holds if and only if 〈i|Qjk|m〉 = 0
for all i 6= m. Subjected to the constraints in Eqs. (26)
and (27), the last line of Eq. (28) is maximized if
Qi0 =
√
pmax − p+Np− 1
pmaxN − 1 |i〉〈i|
+
√
pmax − p
pmaxN − 1
∑
j 6=i
|j〉〈j|
= a(ν,N)I + b(ν,N)|i〉〈i| , (29)
and Qij = 0 for all j 6= 0. (Note that although this set of
Qij ’s is not unique, it is straight-forward to check that all
Qij ’s that maximizes F¯ are equivalent in the sense that
they give the same POVM E .) In addition, the maxi-
mum probability pmax of distinguishing ρi’s is attained
by the measurement operators |i〉〈i|’s as these operators
satisfy Eqs. (7) and (8). Therefore, Qi0 = Mi for all i
and hence E = Ep,pmax . Consequently, for this particular
quantum seal chosen by Alice, F¯ is at most equal to the
right hand side of Eq. (20). Besides, such an equality
can be obtained by using the POVM Ep,pmax . That is
to say, Ep,pmax is an optimal measurement strategy for
Bob with respected to the average fidelity performance
measure when Alice uses the sealing scheme in Eq. (23).
C. Analysis of the measurement strategy with
respected to the average conditional fidelity
performance measure
Using the same notation as in Subsec. III B, the aver-
age conditional fidelity of the state after Bob has applied
the POVM E to the quantum seal in Eq. (23) equals
F¯cond =
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
∑
j |c〈i|Qij |i〉+ dTr(Qij)|2∑
j
[
c〈i|Q†ijQij |i〉+ dTr(Q†ijQij)
] .
(30)
By constrained extremization, it is easy to show that
for a fixed value of
∑
j
[
c〈i|Q†ijQij |i〉+ dTr(Q†ijQij)
]
, the
6ith term in the above equation is maximized if (1)Qij = 0
for all j 6= 0, (2) |k〉 is an eigenvector of Qi0 whose
eigenvalue τik ≥ 0 for all k, (3) τik = τik′ for all
k, k′ 6= i, and (4) τii ≥ τik for all k 6= i. However,
one cannot jump to the conclusion that F¯cond is maxi-
mized by picking Qi0 = a(ν,N)I + b(ν,N)|i〉〈i|. Actu-
ally, this conclusion is wrong in general. A counterex-
ample is given below: let N = 8, pmax = 0.9 and
p = 0.3. By choosing Qi0 = a(ν,N)I + b(ν,N)|i〉〈i|,
F¯cond = 0.980204. In contrast, by choosing Qi0 =
3(2
√
47|i〉〈i|+√13∑j 6=i |j〉〈j|)/15√31 for i = 0, 1, . . . , 5
and Qi0 = (2
√
109|i〉〈i| + 3√29∑j 6=i |j〉〈j|)/5√31 for
i = 6, 7, then F¯cond = 0.981247. That is to say, for
pmax = 0.9 and p = 0.3, the F¯cond caused by a cer-
tain asymmetric set of Kraus operators {Qi0} (in the
sense that there exist i, j such that Qi0 6= UQj0U−1
for some permutation operation U of the standard ba-
sis) is greater than that caused by a symmetric set of
Kraus operators. In fact, this symmetry breaking phe-
nomenon is partly due to the fact that F¯cond(E), unlike
F¯ (E), is not a linear function of E . And the nonlinear
dependence of F¯cond on E makes the determination of
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) difficult.
In spite of this difficulty, the function
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) can be found in the
following three special cases: (1) N ≤ 5, (2) p = 1/N
and (3) p = pmax.
For the first case (N ≤ 5), by constrained
maximization, the ith term in Eq. (30) is upper-
bounded by h(xi) = [a(ν(xi, pmax, N), N) +
b(ν(xi, pmax, N), N)pmax]
2/xi, where xi =∑
j
[
c〈i|Q†ijQij |i〉+ dTr(Q†ijQij)
]
/
∑
j Tr(Q
†
ijQij). Ob-
serve that h(x) is concave for N ≤ 5 and p ∈ [1/N, pmax].
(One way to see this is to use Mathematica to check
that h′′(p) ≤ 0.) Therefore, Eq. (30) is upper bounded
by h(p) = (a + bpmax)
2/p if N ≤ 5. Surely, this upper
bound is attained by picking the POVM Ep,pmax , namely,
the one that also maximizes the performance indicator
F¯ .
The second case (p = 1/N) is trivial as Eq. (22) implies
that the average conditional fidelity of the state after
applying E1/N,pmax equals 1.
For the third case (p = pmax), the symmetry of the
quantum seal in Eq. (23) demands that the denominator
in each term of the sum in Eq. (30) must all equal to
pmax. Using the same constrained maximization analysis
in the first case, each term in Eq. (30) is upper-bounded
by h(pmax) = pmax. Hence, F¯cond ≤ pmax in this case.
Moreover, this upper bound is attained by the POVM
Epmax,pmax .
In summary, I have proven
Theorem 1. Let 1/N ≤ p ≤ pmax. Then,
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯ (p, pmax) = 1−
(√
ν +
1− ν
N
−
√
1− ν
N
)2 [
1− p2max −
(1− pmax)2
N − 1
]
(31)
and
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯cond(p, pmax) ≥
[√
1−ν
N +
(√
ν + 1−νN −
√
1−ν
N
)
pmax
]2
p
, (32)
where ν is given by Eq. (12). In particular, Eq. (32) is an equality if p = 1/N, pmax or N ≤ 5. Furthermore,
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯ (pmax, pmax) = p
2
max +
(1− p2max)
N − 1 (33)
and
min
Alice
max
Bob
F¯cond(pmax, pmax) = pmax . (34)
Figs. 1 and 2 show minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax) and
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) vs. p for different pmax
when N = 2, 4. Note that minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax)
and minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) are discontinuous at
p = 1/N whenever pmax > 1/N . This discontinuity orig-
inates from the sudden change in the dimension of the
set {ρi}N−1i=0 around the point p = 1/N [8]. Besides,
minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax)→ 1−p(1−p2max)/pmax. Note
also that minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax) is a concave func-
tion of p for a fixed value of pmax for F¯ (E) is a linear
function of E .
Finally, I remark that derivations of the upper
and lower bounds for minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax) and
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) reported in this Section
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Dotted curves show
minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax) vs. p for various values of
pmax with (a) N = 2 and (b) N = 4. The solid curves show
the case of p = pmax.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Dotted curves show
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) vs. p for various values
of pmax with (a) N = 2 and (b) N = 4. The solid curves
show the case of p = pmax.
are also valid in the case of determining partial infor-
mation on the original message via the partition P.
IV. PROOF OF INSECURITY OF QUANTUM
SEAL
Although the functional form of
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond(p, pmax) is not known for N > 5
and 1/N < p < pmax, its lower bound stated in Theo-
rem 1 is already sufficiently stringent to help proving the
insecurity of quantum seal. Specifically, to fix ν = 1/2
by choosing the appropriate p, Theorem 1 implies
the existence of a POVM measurement Ep,pmax that
make both minAlicemaxBob F¯ and minAlicemaxBob F¯cond
greater than 1/2 for all N ≥ 2. In other words, this
measurement obtains non-trivial information on the
sealed message and escapes verifier’s detection at least
half of the time. Hence, all quantum seals are insecure.
In fact, the major loophole in He’s proof of the security
of his quantum string seal in Ref. [5] is that he incorrectly
assumed that measuring all the qubits is the only method
to obtain a significant portion of information of the sealed
message.
Recently, He proposed the following method of attack
[13]: Bob measures the sealed message using Πi’s as the
POVM elements with probability 1/2; and he randomly
guesses the sealed message without actually measuring
otherwise. His mixed strategy escapes verifier’s detec-
tion at least half of the time (as measured by F¯ ) and
obtains non-trivial information on the sealed message.
Nevertheless, F¯cond of this strategy approaches pmax/2
as N → ∞. Compared with Theorem 1, the average
conditional fidelity of He’s attack is only about 1/2 that
of the optimal strategy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, I have extended the study of informa-
tion disturbance tradeoff for quantum bit seal [8] to the
case of quantum string seal. Specifically, I show that
the average fidelity and average conditional fidelity of
the measured state is greater than or equal to the right
hand side of Eqs. (31) and (32), respectively. Further-
more, the equalities are simultaneously attained by a
specific quantum sealing scheme provided that N ≤ 5
or p = 1/N, pmax. A consequence of this information
disturbance tradeoff expression is that all quantum seals
are insecure provided that one has access to a quantum
computer.
One of the major reasons I can extend the earlier result
on quantum bit seal in Ref. [8] here is that I replace the
classical L1 distance by the probability of distinguishing
two classical probability distributions. The later concept
readily extends to the case of N > 2. Actually, it can
be shown that for N = 2 the measurement Ep,pmax to-
gether with the expression for minAlicemaxBob F¯ (p, pmax)
are the same as the ones reported in Ref. [8]. I also re-
mark that even though I consider only the case of sealing
finite number of messages, the arguments used in this
Paper can be easily extended to cover the case of seal-
ing infinite number of messages using states in an infinite
dimensional Hilbert space.
Although quantum seal is not unconditionally secure,
the construction of Ep,pmax requires Bob to find the
POVM measurement {Πi} that distinguish the density
matrices ρi’s with a priori probability ηi’s with minimum
error. In general, it is difficult to explicitly find the Πi’s;
and a quantum computer is needed to implement Ep,pmax .
So, it may be possible to construct a quantum seal that
is secure under certain computational or hardware as-
sumptions. Last but not least, it is instructive to find
minAlicemaxBob F¯cond for N > 5 and 1/N < p < pmax.
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